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Whether and in which way the government should help students pay for
a higher education is a matter of great practical and theoretical inter-
est. Yet, there is remarkably little analytical work on the subject.1 In
the presence of full contingent markets allowing potential students to
discount expected future incomes, and assuming no external e¤ects of
university education, there would be no reason for public concern (dis-
tributional considerations could be dealt with separately from educa-
tion). Since markets are incomplete, however, the young have di¢culty
in borrowing against expected future incomes (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981),
and insuring against the risks associated with educational investment.
In the absence of policy, a young person’s ability to attend university
would thus be restricted by the extent to which his parents are able to
support him. It is then possible that a number of young people, who
could gain from attending university, will not do so. There is thus an
argument for relaxing the budget constraint of these young people, and
possibly insuring them against the risk of a poor outcome at university
or, later, in the market place.
Public intervention may be justi…ed also by an externality argument.
If part of the bene…t of a university education accrues to society as a
whole, rather than to the person being educated, the cost should not
fall entirely on the latter. One such e¤ect arises from the existence of a
government budget constraint. Since graduates earn more, on average,
than non graduates, an increase in the number of graduates will expand
the tax base, and thus bene…t all, including non graduates. Additional
externalities arise if a university education increases the productivity,
not only of the graduate himself, but also of those who will work with
him, or ifuniversity graduates raise the cultural level of a country for the
bene…t of all. However, such additional external bene…ts may be o¤set
by the external costs if a university education makes the graduate dis-
satis…ed with intellectually unchallenging (but nonetheless useful) jobs,
or if cultured citizens attract the antipathy of uncultured ones.2
The basic policy question is whether the government should use its
1The importance of education for economic growth is well documented; see, for
example, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992). A good theory-based discussion of dif-
ferent policy proposals regarding the …nancing of higher education students is in
Barr (1991). We are not aware of any formal analysis of whether students should be
…nanced by means of a loan or of a scholarship, and on what conditions.
2Especially if the former exercise undue weight over the destination of public
expenditure. The usual example given is that of the educated middle classes pushing
for public subsidies to art galleries and opera houses, of which they themselves are
overwhelmingly the patrons.
2superior …nancial position to help young people with an aptitude for
higher educationrealize their potential. Subsidiary policy questions con-
cerntheprecise formofthe intervention. We hypothesize aninstitutional
setting where school education is su¢ciently subsidized, and the school
curriculum su¢ciently broad, to allow every young person to reveal both
his aptitude for a university education, and his natural predisposition
towards the study of one or another subject. For simplicity, we also as-
sume that the net e¤ect of allowing an extra person to go to university
onthe welfare of those who will not (but not necessarily onthe welfare of
other graduates) is negligible. This last assumption allows us to restrict
the analysis to those young people who would pro…t from a university
education in the precise sense that, given full contingent markets, they
would have gone to university even without public help. If the number
of graduates has a positive e¤ect on the welfare of non graduates, that
will only strengthen the argument for a policy that facilitates access to
university, and justify …nancing this policy in part with a levy on the
whole population, without necessarily changing the characteristics of the
optimal policy in other respects.
As school records are available to the policy maker, there is no prob-
lem of hidden personal characteristics. There is, however, a hidden ac-
tion problem in that the amount of e¤ort a student puts into his higher
education is private information. One of the subsidiary questions we
shall ask is then how to help students …nancially, without weakening
their incentive to study hard. Another question arises from the fact that
certain university subjects have a higher expected return, in terms of
post-graduation income, than others. In what follows, we shall talk of
”science” referring to subjects that hold the prospect of a well paid job,
of ”arts” referring to less pro…table subjects, but that is just short-hand
(for present purposes, science includes accountancy, arts includes pure
economics). The question is whether students with a natural predispo-
sition for the arts should be allowed to follow their natural inclination,
or pushed towards science. Yet another question concerns the allocation
of risk. Given that university grades, and the level of income after grad-
uation, depend partly on luck, should the policy include some element
of insurance?
A possible solution to the policy problem is a loan guarantee. Loans
give students every possible incentive to do well in their studies. How-
ever, they distort choice towards subjects with a high earning poten-
tial, and discriminate against students from poor families. Both these
drawbacks are mitigated if the re-payment is contingent on realized in-
come.3 An alternative is a scholarship scheme. Scholarships do not dis-
3The ideaof income-contingent loans comes originally from Blaug; see Barr (1991).
3tort choice, and do not discriminate against students from poor families.
However, they give rise to moral hazard, as students (particularly arts
students, whose opportunity-cost in terms of expected future income is
comparatively small) may chooseto have agood time insteadof studying
hard. Furthermore, a scholarship scheme …nanced by general taxation is
generally thought to be regressive, because graduates earn, on average,
more than non graduates.4 This shortcoming is avoided if scholarships
are …nanced by a tax on graduates only. The latter should not take us
far from the optimum if our assumption of negligible spill-over e¤ects on
non graduates is correct.
Our strategy will beto characterizeanoptimal transfer schemewhereby
students receive money from, and graduates pay money to, an educa-
tion authority. The characteristics of these payments at the optimum
will reveal whether the optimal policy is a loan or a scholarship scheme.
The policy optimization has the logical structure of an agency problem,
with the education authority in the role of principal, and potential stu-
dents in that of agents. We shall assume that the objective function of
the principal is the sum of the objective functions of the agents, so that
the interests of the former are not diametrically opposed to those of the
latter.5
2 Agents
In the present context, an agent is someone who just …nished school
with su¢ciently high grades to make him university material. University
material means that, were this person able to trade in full contingent
markets, he would be better-o¤ going to university than straight into
the labour market. Suppose there are only two types of agent, a (for
”arty”) and s (for ”scienti…c”). We assume that the education authority
has access to school records, and thus knows which potential students
are of type a, and which are of type s. The analysis covers two periods:
period 1, when an agent can be either a student or a young worker, and
period 2, when he is either a graduate or a non-graduate worker.
Let ej (belongingto the closedinterval E = [e;e] 2 R+) denote study
e¤ort by student j, and e the vector of e¤orts put in by the di¤erent
4This point was made by Friedman (1962) and is supported by empirical research
in Hansen and Weisbrod (1969). Since then, several empirical studies have addressed
the question of the distributional impact of subsidies to higher education. Some
papers support the ”Friedman thesis”, but most of them seem to …nd that the impact
is progressive. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom seems to favour the view that
subsidies are regressive; see, e.g., the discussion in Barbaro (2002).
5A policy problem with a similar structure is in Cigno, Luporini and Pettini
(2002). There, however, the role of agent is plaid by parents of young children, not
by the children themselves, and the issues are quite di¤erent.
4students.6 Similarly, let dj denote thetype ofdegreechosen by student j,
and d the vector of degree types chosen by all students. We characterize
a degree by the proportion of science subjects included in it (d = 0 if
the curriculum consists entirely of arts subjects, d = 1 if it includes only
science subjects). E¤ort is not observable, but the choice of degree is.
The …nal degree result of student j is denoted by xj (belonging to the
closed interval X = [x;x] 2 R),7 and those of all students by the vector
x: Ex ante, degree results are distributed with joint density f (x;e),
assumed known.8 Having assumed that the characteristics (a or s) of
each agent are also known, the uncertainty surroundingthe realization of
xj, for any givenej, ispurely thee¤ect ofluck inuniversity examinations.
Studying harder does, however, make it more likely that a student will
obtain high grades, in the precise sense that the cumulative distribution
ofxj associated with a higher ej stochastically dominates that associated
with a lower ej.
In period 1, agents decide whether to attend university or go straight
into the labour market. If agent j chooses to be a student, he receives
m
j
1 + yj. We may interpret m
j
1 as parental support, and yj as either
a loan (guaranteed by the government) or a scholarship. The vector of
parental support levels, and that of the scholarships or loans, received
by the di¤erent students are respectively represented by m1 and y. If
the agent chooses to go straight into the labour market, he earns w1 (all
young workers earn the same). Both m1 and w1 are de…ned net of any
general income tax. Both are certain, and known. In assuming this of
m1, we are in e¤ect saying that, if a young person goes to university, his
parents are somehowobliged to support him at some level (dependent on
their means).9 Were that not the case, parents would in fact be tempted
6If there were only two students, one of each type, we could simply write ea and
es. Since there are many agents of the same type, however, we keep to the generic j
index.
7In some university systems, there is an actual degree result. In others, we may
think of the degree result as of the average of the grades obtained in individual exams.




) is increasing in xj, holds with respect to agent j’s e¤ort, and that the upper
cumulative probabilities of xj are nondecreasing and concave in ej. These assump-
tions guarantee that the …rst order approach is valid in multi-signal principal-agent
models (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994). By ensuring uniqueness of the agent’s choice of
e¤ort, they will allow us to substitute the …rst-order condition of the agent’s problem
for the incentive compatibility constraint in the principal’s optimization problem (see
section 3).
9That used to be the case, for example, in pre-Thacher UK, where the grant
awarded to a student admitted to university included a mandatory parental support
element, calculated on the basis of parental income.
5to free-ride.
In period 2, agent j gets w2 +m
j
2 ¡¿j if he is a graduate, w2 if he is
not. We interpret w2 as theearnings of anon-graduate adult worker (the
same for everyone), and m
j
2 as a skill premium. Depending on whether
yj is a loan or a scholarship, ¿j is either a loan re-payment or a graduate
tax. All payments are discounted back to period 1 at the given rate of
interest.10 The vector of the skill premia earned by the di¤erent agents
is denoted by m2, that of the loan re-payments or graduate taxes by
¿. Both w2 and m2 are net of any general income tax (raised by the
government for purposes other than university education, and payable
by everyone).
We assume that both m2 and w2 are observable ex post. While w2 is
certain and known in advance, however, m2 is distributed ex ante with
known joint density g (m2;x;d), conditional on degree types and degree
results. The cumulative distribution of m
j
2 associated with a higher dj
or xj stochastically dominates that associated with a lower dj or xj. In
other words, higher grades, or a degree with a higher science content,
make it more likely that the graduate will get a high income in period
2. For any given dj and xj, the uncertainty surrounding the realization
of m
j
2 re‡ects j’s luck in …nding a well paid job.
Let zj (dj;ej) be the cost of studying the subject mix dj for student
j. This cost includes not only the actual expenses incurred, and the
current income forgone, in attending university, but also the consump-
tion equivalent of the disutility of study e¤ort.11 This disutility may
well be negative for certain values of dj and ej (in other words, at least
up to a certain e¤ort level, studying the subjects of one’s choice may
be a pleasure). Even though the other cost components are necessarily
positive, zj may thus have any sign. To ensure convexity, we assume
that the marginal cost of e¤ort is positive and increasing for all students
(zej > 0, zejej > 0). We also assume that, as the subject mix becomes
more scienti…c, the cost of getting a degree increases for the a type, but
not necessarily for the s one; in any case, it increases more for the former




assume that an increase in the science content of the degree raises the
marginal cost of e¤ort if the student has a natural disposition towards
the arts, but not necessarily if he is predisposed towards the study of
science; in any case, it raises it more for the former than for the latter
(if j is an a, and k is an s, z
j
ejdj > zk
ekdk). The function zj (:) is known
10Recall that, although agents cannot borrow, the principal can. Expressing
period-2 payments in period-1 money avoids carrying the discount factor around.
11We may similarly think of wt as earnings net of the consumption-equivalent of
the disutility of labour.
6to all concerned.

















1 is the consumption of agent j in period t. The functions ut (:)
are assumed increasing and concave, with u0
t (0) = 1. In the absence of
credit markets allowing young people to borrow against expected future
income, agent j faces a separate budget constraint for each period. In
the absence of insurance markets allowing him to insure against poor








if he goes to university, by
c
j
1 = w1 (3)
if he does not. In the absence of insurance markets allowing him to
insure against bad luck in the graduate labour market, his consumption
in period 2 is
c
j




if j is a graduate,
c
j
2 = w2 (5)
if he is not. Both yj and ¿j may be functions of any of the observed vari-
ables. Thus, yj may depend on m1, and be conditional onthe realization
of x, while ¿j may depend on any of m1, m2, x and y.
For the generic agent (j index omitted), the pay-o¤ to being a stu-










with c1 and c2 given by (2) and (4), maximized with respect to the

























u2fgddxdm2 = 0: (8)
The pay-o¤ to being a young worker, denoted by ¼(w1;w2;¿), is the
value of the agent’s expected utility, with c1 and c2 determined by (3)
and (5):
7The agent will choose to be a student if and only if
¼
¤(m1;w2;y;¿) ¸ ¼ (w1;w2): (9)
In other words, a person will not go to university if so doing would leave
him worse-o¤ than going straight into the labour market. Therefore, in
the absence of public support, or if this were not su¢ciently generous, a
number of agents would not attend university. That would have a social
cost because, by de…nition of agent, the expected gain from a university
education is greater than the cost.
3 Principal
The principal is an education authority with the power to guarantee
student loans, or to pay out scholarships …nanced by a debt issue, and
recover the cost by raising education-speci…c taxes (a ”graduate tax”).
The authority chooses (e;d;y;¿) so as to maximize the sum of the ex-


























subject to (2) ¡ (5) for each j, and to a number of other restrictions.
Since the authority is ultimately responsible for the cost of y, ir-
respective of whether the elements of y are scholarships or guaranteed

















where yj and ¿j may be contingent on any of the observed variables.
Writing this constraint inexpectedvalue terms implies that the principal
faces no uncertainty about how much it will have to pay out in total
to students in period 1, and how much it will get back in total from
graduates in period 2. Therefore, the number of agents is ”large”. This
could mean either that there are many students of each type, or that
there are many types of student. Having assumed that there are only
two types (a and s), there must then be many students of each type.
Inadditiontotheintertemporal budget constraint, theprincipal faces
two restrictions for each agent j: One is that the principal’s choice of ej
must satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint in the form of (7).
There is no such restriction on the principal’s choice of dj, because the
8subject mix is observable, and thus controllable.12 The other is a par-
ticipation constraint in the form of (9). If individual e¤ort were observ-
able by the education authority, neither of these additional restrictions
would be binding for any of the agents. If individual e¤ort is not ob-
servable, it can be shown, using standard techniques, that the incentive-
compatibility constraints are binding. Since the same is not necessarily
true of the participation constraints, however, we shall develop the ar-
gument assuming, at …rst, that none of the these constraints is binding.
Then, we shall see what happens if the assumption is relaxed.
The …rst-order condition on the principal’s choice of yj is
(u
0












where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier associatedwith the principal’s budget
constraint, and ¹j the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive
compatibility constraint concerning j’s e¤ort.
In …rst best (¹j = 0 for all j), (12) reduces to u0
1 = ¸, implying
that each agent must be guaranteed a certain c
j
1, irrespective of m
j
1 and
xj. The …rst-best policy thus re-distributes from rich to poor students,
and across states of nature. In other words, if e¤ort were observable, it
would be optimal for the authority to fully compensate students for any
di¤erence in the cost of getting a degree, or shortfall in the amount of
support received from their parents. It would also be optimal to provide
each student with full insurance against the risk of getting a poor degree
result (or failing outright) in period 1. This ”full insurance” result is
standard in principal-agent models. In standard principal-agent models,
however, it descends from the assumption that the principal is less risk-
averse than the agent. Here, by contrast, the principal is as risk-averse
as any of the agents, and the result descends from the fact that the
principal does not face any …nancial risk.13
If individual e¤ort is not observable, the principal must be content


















12It can be controlled by o¤ering the agent a kind of contract (”forcing contract”):
”if you choose the dj I tell you, I shall pay you the optimal yj now, and charge you
the optimal ¿ j next period; if you do not, I shall pay you a lower (even zero) yj now,
or charge you a punitive ¿j next period.”
13The same occurs in Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2002), which also has aprincipal
maximizing the sum of the expected utilities of a large number of agents.
9is the Arrow-Pratt measureof absolute risk aversion (assumedconstant).
Since the r.h.s. of (13) is increasing in xj, and the l.h.s. increasing in c
j
1,
the amount paid to the student, yj, must be an increasing function of
the student’s degree result, xj. It must also be higher for students with
lower parental support, m
j
1, or higher cost of attending university, zj.
As in …rst best, the policy will thus re-distribute in favour of students
from poorer families, and of students who (because of their personal
characteristics, or choice of subject mix) face a higher cost of education.
Perfect equality will not be achieved, however, because students must
nowbe given anincentive to study hard. The more costly it is to provide
a certain type of student withthis incentive, the more his choice of e¤ort
level will be distorted.
If the random variable a¤ecting the degree result of student j (for
any given level of e¤ort) is stochastically independent of those a¤ecting
the degree results of other students, the second-best value of yj does
not depend on the results obtained by other students. Otherwise, the
likelihood ratio
fej(x;e)
f(x;e) will be a function of the entire x vector (Holm-
ström, 1982; Mookherjee, 1984). If that is the case, and if the random
variables a¤ecting degree results for any given level of e¤ort are a¢liated
and dependent,14 the second-best yj is increasing in xj, and decreasing
in xk (j 6= k)15. In other words, ranking matters. An implication is that
grade drift should not fool the education authority into granting larger
loans or higher scholarships to everybody.
The …rst-order conditions on the principal’s choice of dj and ej are
long and unwieldy. We approach them one step at a time. Using (13),























14A¢liation implies that the random variables tend to ”move together”. In other
words, if variables are a¢liated, it is more likely that their realized values will be all
high, or all low, than that some will be high, and others low. A¢liation includes the
case of independence. Since a¢liated random variables have nonnegative covariance,
a¢liation can be seen as a form of positive correlation (provided that such covariance
exists). Here, we consider the case of dependent a¢liated random variables. For a
formal discussion, see the Appendix.
15That yj increases in xj when
fej(x;e)
f (x;e) is monotone in xj is a well known result
(see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995). That yj monotonically decreases
in xj when the random variables are a¢liated is proved in Luporini (2002). A sketch
of the proof is given in the Appendix.
10where the l.h.s. is the expected e¤ect of either dj or ej on the principal’s
optimization (the more science subjects agent j takes, or the harder he
studies during period 1, the more he is expected to earn, and pay in
taxes, during period 2). What does that tell us about the choice of
e¤ort and subject mix for agent j?
Let us specialize the analysis a little by assuming that the cost of a
university education increases with its science content for students with
a natural disposition towards the arts, but decreases for those who are
predisposed to the study of science (z
j
dj positive or negative, depending
on whether j is an a or an s). Since a degree with a high science content
pays, on average, more than a degree with a high arts content, an s
will then study science subjects only (dj = 1). By contrast, an a will
not necessarily study arts subjects only (dj ¸ 0), because a lower d is
associated with a lower expected m2. Therefore, (15) holds for an a, but
not for an s. The argument runs as follows.
If ej were the same for both types, the r.h.s. of (16) would be higher
for the a, than for the s type. We shall see below that ¿j is generally
higher for the latter. This, together with the fact that s-types earn
more than a-types, implies that the l.h.s. would then be higher for the
former, than for the latter. Therefore, in …rst best, ej will be higher for
the scienti…c than for the arty type. The same would be true if z
j
dj were
positive for students predisposed to the study of science (in which case,
these students would not necessarily study science subjects only), but
still increasing more slowly for this than for the other type of student as
assumed.
We have thus found that, in …rst best, the arty type will not only
take less science subjects, but also supply less e¤ort, than the scienti…c
type. Intuitively, that is because the expected return to investing in a
university education is lower for the former than for the latter. Since
the principal is maximizing the sum of the expected utilities (not the
sum of the incomes, or abilities to pay tax) of the agents, it then follows
that students with scienti…c talent should optimally invest more in their
education (put in more e¤ort, sacri…ce more current consumption), than
students with a natural disposition towards the arts.


































theexpectedexternal bene…t (throughthegovernmentbudget constraint)





















is the e¤ect of a higher dj on the expectedmarginal disutility of e¤ort. It
is thus the expected indirect e¤ect on j’s period-1 utility of inducing this









ejdj are positive for the a
type, but negative for the s type, Dj is positive (and dj = 1 as in …rst








also positive, is the expected indirect e¤ect on agent j’s period-2 utility
of pushing agent j towards science.
If time-preference is su¢ciently high, Dj ¡ Fj is positive for a-type
agents. As Bj + Ej must then be larger than Cj, this means that dj
will be lower than in …rst best for this type of agent. Therefore, the
second-best scheme actually encourages students with an aptitude for
the arts to specialize further in their preferred subjects than they would
in …rst best. The intuitiveexplanation is that, as e¤ort is not observable,
and providing the agent with the right incentive is consequently costly,
the principal makes it easier for the arty student to get higher grades




ejdj are negative for
s-type students, agents of this type will be at a corner (dj = 1); if they
are positive, dj is lower than in …rst best for s types too. Otherwise, we
cannot say whether dj is higher or lower than in …rst best.















denote the net e¤ect, which may be shown to be positive, of ej on the





m2¿jfejgdxdm2, arises from the fact that, the harder agent
j studies during period 1, the more he is likely to earn and thus, if
¿j is increasing in m
j
2, pay in taxes or loan re-payment during period
2. The second partial e¤ect, ¡
R
xyjfejdx, tells us that, the harder j
12studies during period 1, the larger the scholarship or the loan that he
gets during period 1. If we assume that the random components of the
di¤erent elements of x are uncorrelated, the condition on e is that Gj
must be equal to an unwieldy expression (not reported), positive for the
agent’s second-order conditions, representing the net e¤ect of ej on the
incentive compatibilityconstraint foragent j. Underthis assumption, we
cansay that the second-bestchoiceofej islower than in…rst best, but we
cannot say whether it is still lower for the arty than for the scienti…ctype
(because it may cost the principal less to give the incentive to a, than
to s types).16 If the random components are correlated, the condition
contains additional terms (representing cross-e¤ects), that make it quite
impossible to say anything about the second-best choice of ej.
The …rst-order condition on the amount (loanre-paymentor graduate
tax) that agent j must pay in period 2, ¿j, is
¡u
0
2f + ¸f ¡ ¹
ju
0
2fej = 0; (18)























What (20) says is that all graduates must be assured the same level of
consumption in period 2, irrespective of the state of nature, and irre-
spective, also, of what happened in period 1. Therefore, the …rst-best
¿j is an increasing function of m
j
2. Since, on average, science gradu-
ates have higher income than arts graduates, the …rst-best policy then
re-distributes income from science to arts graduates.
In second best (¹j > 0), the principal must take into account also the
disincentive e¤ect of ¿j on study e¤ort. Hence, ¿j is decreasing in xj.
This may modify the …rst-best conclusion that science graduates must
pay more than arts graduates. In …rst best, ej is in fact lower for a than
for s types. This is not necessarily true in second best. If, however, the
e¤ort level is lower for the arty type, and the marginal distributions of
xj are the same (in other words, greater e¤ort has the same e¤ect on
the probability of getting high grades) for both types, it then follows
16The trade-o¤ between productivity and incentive costs is analyzed in Kim (1995)
and Robbins and Sarath (1996).
13that the expected x will be lower for the arty type.17 Hence, period-2
consumption must be lower for the latter.
Since the second-best ¿j is increasing in m
j
2, and the second-best m
j
2
is likely to be lower for a than for s types (because, for the same degree
result, arts graduates have lower income on average, but also because
arts students are induced to put in less e¤ort, and will thus get lower
degree results on average), it is unlikely that ¿j will be larger for the
former than for the latter, but the opposite cannot be excluded a priori.
In other words, arts graduate pay on average less than science graduates,
but there is no reason why a highly successful arts graduates should be
asked to pay less than an equally successful science graduate.
If the random components of the x vector are dependent and a¢li-
ated, the second-best ¿j is decreasing in xj, but increasing in the other
elements of x. Therefore, not only yj, but also ¿j, should take account
of j’s ranking in terms of degree result. By contrast, even if the random
components of the vector m2 were not independent, the second-best ¿j
would still depend on m
j
2 only, because the marginal utility of j’s con-
sumptiondoes not depend on that of other people. A positive (negative)
macroeconomic shock, bringing all graduate incomes up (down), should
thus bring all the elements of ¿ up (down).
Let us nowconsiderthe possibility that the participationconstraint is
binding for some agents. As already pointed out, that will never happen
in …rst best. It may be true in second best, however, because the cost to
the principal of providing some agent with the incentive to study hard
could outweigh the expected bene…t of sending him to university. If
the constraint is binding for anybody, that is likely to be the arty type,
because these students have a lower expected period-2 income, for any
given private cost, than the scienti…c type. That does not necessarily
mean that arts graduates will have lower period-2 consumption than
science graduates, however, because the authority will re-distribute in
their favour. In second best, however, equality is not achieved (and,
the higher the cost to the principal of providing arty students with the
incentive to study hard, the further we shall be from equality). It could
thus happen that the period-2 gain is not large enough to compensate
the potential arts student for the period-1 loss from attendinguniversity.
If that is the case, not all agents will (apply for a loan or scholarship to
help them) go to university.
Let Àj be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation
constraint (9) for agent j. If the constraint is binding for agent j, the
17Note that, due to our assumptions, xj could be lower for the arty than for the
scienti…c type even if ej were higher for the former than for the latter.





1+yj¡xj). As Àj is positive, the second-best yj
is then larger than it would be otherwise. A similar argument applies






2¡¿ j). The second-best ¿j is then smaller than it would
be otherwise. If, as seems likely, the agent in question is of type a, the
policy re-distributes even further in favour of these students. That is as
one would have expected, because arts students gain less than science
students from a university education.
We now come to the central question, whether the optimal (…rst or
second best) policy is a loan or a scholarship scheme. Having found
that, whether e¤ort is observable or not, the period-2 payment required
of agent j, ¿j, should be independent of the amount paid to him in
period 1, yj, we can conclude that yj is not a loan, and that ¿j cannot
be construed to be a loan re-payment. In the …rst-best solution, yj
is e¤ectively a personalized lump-sum subsidy, and ¿j a personalized
lump-sum tax. If e¤ort were observable, the education authority would
in fact know all there is to be known about potential students.18 In
the second-best solution (e¤ort not observable), yj may be interpreted
as a scholarship conditional on both need and merit, and ¿j as a tax
conditional on income and merit. There is nothing to suggest that the
optimal yj is additively separable into two payments, one dependent on
”need” (m
j
1) only, and the other dependent on ”merit” (xj) only.
Both the …rst and the second-best policy re-distribute from the rel-
atively rich to the relatively poor (from students with high parental
support to students with low parental support, from science graduates,
who earn on average more, to arts graduates, who earn on average less).
The second-best scheme re-distributes also from the less to the more aca-
demically successful. The second-best scholarshipis in fact decreasing in
parental support, and increasing in university results. The second-best
graduate tax is increasing in graduate income, and decreasing in aca-
demic performance. Both the award of the scholarship, and the amount
of the tax, are conditional on the agent taking a prescribed course of
study (but this does not go against, if anything encourages, the stu-
dent’s predisposition). If the agent chooses otherwise, he will either not
get the scholarship, or be charged a punitive tax.
18Parental support, and aptitude for di¤erent types of study, are assumed known
anyway.
154 Discussion
Our analysis started from the premise that, in the absence of full con-
tingent markets, a number of young people who would have otherwise
attended university education will not do so. It may thus be possible to
increase social welfare by helping these young persons to attend univer-
sity. The question is how. Loans give students every incentive to apply
themselves, but distort choice towards subjects with a higher earning
potential; they are also unfair to students from poor families. Scholar-
ships do not distort choice, but give rise to a moral hazard problem in
that students of subjects with limited earning potential may be tempted
to shirk. If they are …nanced out of general taxation, scholarships may
also be unfair to non graduates.
Our answer is that potential university students with the right char-
acteristics (such that they would choose to attend university in the pres-
ence of full contingent markets) should be o¤ered a scholarship depen-
dent on both ”need” (parental support) and ”merit” (academic perfor-
mance). The scheme should be …nanced by a graduate tax designed
so as to re-distribute income from the better paid, to the academically
more successful (as well as from students coming from richer family to
students coming from poor ones).
The award of a scholarship should be conditional on the choice of
university degree (those who choose to do otherwise should be denied
a scholarship, or charged a punitive tax). But students with a natural
aptitude for studies that do not hold the prospect of a well paid job
(”arts”) should not be pushed towards potentially more lucrative studies
(”science”). Combined with the proposition that, other things being
equal, better paid graduates should be taxed more than low paid ones,
this implies some degree of cross-…nancing of arts studies.
If e¤ort were observable, students should be required to take the very
typeof degree that they wouldhave chosen, inthe presence offull contin-
gent markets. Since study e¤ort is not observable, the choice of subject
mix should be distorted. In the absence of either perfect contingent
markets, or government policy, there would be two kinds of distortion.
First, some whocouldhave bene…tted from goingtouniversity would not
do so. Second, those who would go to university would choose a more
scienti…c mix of subjects than is e¢cient. The second-best policy pushes
in the opposite direction, in the sense that it requires arty students to
specialize in their preferred subjects even further than they would have
done otherwise. That is because pushing such students into taking more
arts subjects makes studying ”easier” (less costly, more pleasurable) for
them, and it thus reduces the cost to the education authority of provid-
ing them with the incentive to study hard. In second best, not all those
16who could have bene…tted from a university education will necessarily
do so.
The …nding that second-best scholarships and graduate taxes should
depend on academic performance gives rise to a practical issue that we
have not discussed so far. If the education authority could observe only
…nal degree results, our …nding would imply that at least part (perhaps
a large part) of the award should be paid on graduation only. That
would be a problem, because we are assuming that students cannot
support themselves by borrowing. Fortunately, however, partial results
are generally available at fairly frequent intervals, such as the quarter or
the year. The scholarship can then be paid in installments, and the total
amount adjusted quarterly or yearly as the examination record builds
up.
If the random components of the university results of di¤erent agents
are related in the technical sense explained in the text, the second-best
scholarship that a person receives as a student, and the second-best tax
that he will have to pay as a graduate, take account not only of his own
degree result, but also of those of other students. An implication, if the
correlation is positive, is that an (upward) grade drift should not fool
the education authority into giving every student a higher scholarship,
or charging every graduate a lower tax. By contrast, even if the random
components of graduate incomes were positively correlated, the second-
best tax payable by a graduate takes only account of his income, and
not also of the incomes of others. The reason for this asymmetry is
that income comparisons do not convey information, additional to that
already provided by grade comparisons, on the amount of study e¤ort
that a person put in as a student.19
Having established that the amount of money a person should op-
timally pay as a graduate does not depend on the amount of public
money received as a student, the latter cannot be interpreted as a loan,
or the former as a loan re-payment. Any direct link between individual
payments and receipts would in fact impose an unnecessary constraint
on the design of policy. Even a loose link, as envisaged in an income
contingent loan scheme, does not appear to be justi…ed on theoretical
grounds. There is, furthermore, nothing in the analytical results to sug-
gest that the optimal policy could be run as two parallel schemes, one
awarding ”student grants” on the basis of ”need” (lack of parental sup-
19That is strictly true, however,only because we are assumed that the probability of
a high income depends only on dregree type, and degree result. Income comparisons
would be relevant, in determining the level of the tax, if we allowed for the fact that
income depends not only on quali…cations, but also on e¤ort in …nding and keeping
a good job.
17port), and the other awarding ”scholarships” on the basis of ”merit”
(academic performance):
Our analysis presupposes the existence of a school system which
makes it possible for every child to reveal his natural talent, and his
aptitude for di¤erent types of studies. Therefore, our conclusions do
not apply with equal force to an institutional setting where school at-
tendance (or access to good schools) is restricted by ability to pay, or
where premature specialization may prevent individual characteristics
from being revealed to the full.
5 Appendix
In this Appendix we brie‡y examine the consequences of the assumption




full discussion of this topic is in Luporini (2002).
Following the standard approach (Mirrlees, 1974), we have treated
the…nal degreeresults, xj, as randomvariables withjoint densityf(x;e),
parameterized by the vector of agents’ e¤orts, e: Inother words, we have
implicitly assumed that, given a certain level of e¤ort, the result is af-
fected by a random component. Alternatively, we could consider xj as





, of both e¤ort, ej, and a random variable,
µ
j, representing the in‡uence of luck on university results. Let xj be
monotonically increasing in both ej and µ





. If we as-
sume that the elements of µ have joint density g(µ), f(x;e) becomes the
transformation obtained from g via the functions xj.
Assumethat the elements ofµ are a¢liated, non-independentrandom
variables. For simplicity, we consider a bivariate case where j = A;B,
but de…nitions and results generalize to multivariate random variables.






is said to be a¢liated (Milgrom




















A > µA and µ
B > µB:
(21)
A¢liation broadly means that the random variables tend to move to-
gether, i.e. that a high realization of µ
A is more likely in the case of a
high than in the case of a low realization of µB. Note that independent
random variables are a¢liated since, in that case, (21) always holds as
an equation.
Consider now (13) for agent A (the same argument obviously holds
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